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experience of an event at T 1 (1937) . Your earliest memory is now of a later time T 2 (1938).
That means you are not identical to a being that existed in 1937-at least according to the unreconstructed Lockean memory criterion. Locke wrote: "For whatever any substance has thought or done which I cannot recollect and by my consciousness make my own thought and action, it will no longer belong to me. 4 But it isn't clear that such a move is in the spirit of Locke for it lacks the intuitive appeal that one goes back in time as far as one's consciousness extends. Mayra Shectman makes this point well:
"Certainly a view that places identity in the ancestral relation of psychological connection rather than in direct connection does not have Reid's transitivity problem, but it is also not clear that it captures the relation we take to underlie the importance of personal identity. Locke's observation is, roughly speaking, that it is my direct conscious access to experience makes it mine. This is not, however, the relation in terms of which psychological continuity theorists define identity. With Reid's objection in mind, these theorists place identity in a weaker relation that does not demand direct conscious access to the actions and experiences that are ours -the ancestral relation of direct access. It is not obvious, however, that this weaker relation can rightfully claim to have all the intuitive appeal as the bearer of identity that the original relation had. In fact 6 psychological continuity theorists make it clear that they attach much more importance to direct connections than to the weaker relation of continuity." 9 The importance of direct psychological connections rather than the overlapping chains of psychological continuity is evidenced in the claims of modern day neoLockeans like Parfit and Lewis. They stress psychological connectedness more than continuity. Parfit writes "of these two general relations, connectedness is more important (than continuity) in both theory and practice." 10 Lewis makes a similar point in his account of Methuselah. He writes that "We sometimes say: in later life I will be a different person. For us short-lived creatures, such remarks are an extravagance. A philosophical study of personal identity can ignore them. For Methuselah, however, the fading-out of personal identity looms large as a fact of life. It is incumbent on us to make it literally true that he will be a different person after one and one-half centuries or so."
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Leaving aside for the moment that appeals to psychological continuity seem to be missing something important about identity across time, it is worth noting that the revised Lockean account Parfit offers can handle Reid's objection but not the backward causation problem. Partfit understands psychological continuity to consist of "the holding of overlapping chains of strong connectedness." 12 And strong psychological connectedness between any two days, involves at least half the number of direct connections that hold, over every day, in the lives of nearly every actual person. 13 So if a blow to the head today leaves you with slightly less than half the normal psychological connections between today and yesterday, then there is not enough connections to establish psychological continuity between you today and any person yesterday, thus your origins have changed and you did not exist in the last century or even the previous week. Your origins were much more recent.
One can avoid this problem by claiming that any degree of memory connections is sufficient for continuity but only if one is willing to accept that one doesn't survive a stroke that is of sufficient severity that one is left a permanent amnesiac regarding any pre-stroke aspects of one's biography. If one does survive such a stroke, then one has new origins given that psychological continuity doesn't extend back to a time before the stroke. However, one might try to claim that the psychological continuity account allows that we survive such strokeinduced amnesia in a way that preserves our earlier origins because psychological continuity 
